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A STRONGER DEFENSIVE LINE: 
EXTENDING NFL OWNERS’ ANTITRUST 
IMMUNITY THROUGH THE NORRIS-
LAGUARDIA ACT IN BRADY v. NFL 
Abstract: On July 8, 2011, in Brady v. NFL, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevented the in-
junction of an NFL lockout. In so doing, the court provided to the NFL an 
additional shield from antitrust scrutiny. This Comment argues that by 
immunizing NFL lockouts from antitrust scrutiny, NFL players will lose an 
important bargaining tool: the antitrust challenge. 
Introduction 
 On July 25, 2011 the National Football League (NFL) announced 
that its owners and players had reached a ten-year collective bargaining 
agreement, thereby preserving the 2011 professional football season.1 
This agreement ended a 136-day “lockout” —the longest in NFL his-
tory—during which players could not practice or use any NFL facilities.2 
 During the stalemate, nine professional players—including some 
of the game’s most well-known athletes—and one prospective player 
(the “Players”) filed Brady v. NFL in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota, seeking an injunction to end the NFL’s lockout.3 
The Players’ complaint alleged that the lockout constituted a collusive 
agreement among the team owners and violated federal antitrust laws.4 
The district court granted a preliminary injunction of the lockout and 
the NFL appealed.5 On July 8, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction in Brady, finding 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Jarrett Bell, Deal Done, NFL on Fast Track, USA Today, July 26, 2011, at 1C. 
2 See Brady v. NFL (Brady II ), 644 F.3d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 2011); Bell, supra note 1. 
3 See Brady v. NFL (Brady I ), 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (D. Minn. 2011), rev’d, 644 F.3d 
661 (8th Cir. 2011). 
4 See id. at 998, 1004. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits agreements and 
conspiracies “in restraint of trade.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Players’ complaint alleged 
that the lockout constituted an illegal agreement among the NFL teams to coerce the 
players into agreeing to “drastically” reduced compensation levels. First Amended Class 
Action Complaint at 2–3, Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (No. 11-CV-639). 
5 Brady II, 644 F.3d at 669 (hearing the appeal); Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1043 (grant-
ing the injunction). 
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that the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA) proscribed court intervention 
in such a dispute.6 
 Part I of this Comment outlines the courts’ historical use of the 
“non-statutory labor exemption” —a limited exemption from antitrust 
laws for union-employer agreements—to balance the competing aims 
of federal antitrust and labor policies.7 Then, Part II examines the 
Eighth Circuit’s novel use of the NLGA in Brady to achieve this same 
purpose.8 Finally, Part III explores the consequences of Brady and ar-
gues that applying the NLGA to NFL lockouts thwarts players’ abilities 
to bargain effectively and protect their rights.9 
I. The Non-Statutory Labor Exemption Historically  
Has Determined the Availability of Antitrust  
Relief in NFL Suits 
 From the NFL’s inception in 1920 until 1968, the NFL’s club own-
ers unilaterally controlled the NFL’s operations.10 In 1968, the National 
Labor Relations Board (the “Labor Board”) recognized the NFL Players 
Association (the “Players Union”) as the exclusive bargaining represen-
tative of all NFL players.11 Later that year, the NFL and the Players Un-
ion entered into their first collective-bargaining agreement (“CBA”).12 
 Since 1968, the NFL and the Players Union have negotiated several 
CBAs, and have engaged in multiple lawsuits.13 Typically, the players 
have brought suit to enjoin the NFL from enforcing certain terms of 
employment, such as wages or free agency restrictions, and have argued 
that the enforcement of such terms by all NFL club owners violates an-
titrust laws.14 
                                                                                                                      
6 Brady II, 644 F.3d at 663. The NLGA prohibits courts from issuing injunctions “in a 
case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,” except under certain conditions set forth 
in the Act. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2006). 
7 See infra notes 10–34 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 35–93 and accompanying text 
9 See infra notes 94–113 and accompanying text. 
10 See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976). 
11 See id. The Labor Board is an independent federal agency which oversees the certifi-
cation of unions and also adjudicates charges of unfair labor practices. What We Do, NLRB, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 
12 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610. 
13 See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 518 U.S. 231, 234 (1996); Powell v. NFL (Powell 
II ), 930 F.2d 1293, 1295–96 (8th Cir. 1989); Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609. 
14 See, e.g., Brown, 518 U.S. at 234 (challenging development squad wages); Mackey, 543 
F.2d at 609 (challenging free agency restrictions). 
2012 Brady, Antitrust Immunity, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act 125 
 Yet, before a court can address the antitrust claims, it must first 
determine whether the non-statutory labor exemption applies.15 The 
non-statutory labor exemption is a judicially-created shield which insu-
lates certain agreements between unions and employers from antitrust 
scrutiny.16 Although statutory exemptions were created to protect un-
ions from antitrust scrutiny (despite their inherently anticompetitive 
nature), the statutes did not explicitly exempt the agreements between 
unions and employers, such as the CBAs between the NFL and the 
Players Union.17 
 The Supreme Court created the non-statutory labor exemption to 
allow such collective bargaining to work: without antitrust immunity for 
the agreement between a union and employer, there would be no 
agreement.18 Because the non-statutory labor exemption protects the 
agreement between unions and employers, either side can invoke the 
exemption.19 Therefore, when the non-statutory labor exemption ap-
plies to the terms of a CBA, the NFL effectively achieves immunity from 
antitrust scrutiny on those terms.20 
 The Eighth Circuit first addressed the applicability of the non-
statutory labor exemption in the NFL context in 1976 in Mackey v. 
NFL.21 In Mackey, a group of players sought injunctive relief from the 
“Rozelle Rule,” which severely restricted the ability of free agents to 
switch teams, and had been included in the two prior CBAs.22 To de-
termine whether the non-statutory labor exemption applied, the court 
set forth the Mackey test, which required that: (1) the restraint on trade 
                                                                                                                      
15 See, e.g., Brown, 518 U.S. at 235 (holding that the Court could not address the anti-
trust claims because the non-statutory labor exemption applied); Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1297 
(same); Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611–12, 616 (holding that the court could address the antitrust 
claims because the non-statutory labor exemption did not apply); McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. 
Supp. 871, 885 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that the court could proceed with a trial on the 
merits on the antitrust claims because the non-statutory labor exemption did not apply). 
16 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611–12. 
17 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 (2006) (prohibiting injunctions in labor disputes); id. 
§ 113 (defining labor disputes); Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (declaring that 
labor organizations are not illegal combinations in violation of antitrust laws); Clayton Act 
§ 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (prohibiting injunctions of certain strikes and other labor organiza-
tion activities); Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611–12. 
18 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611–12 (citing Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 
U.S. 616, 621–22 (1975); Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965)). 
19 See id. at 612 (citing Meat Cutters, 381 U.S. at 729–32 (Goldberg, J., concurring); 
Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974)). 
20 See, e.g., Brown, 518 U.S. at 235; Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1297; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611; 
McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 885. 
21 See 543 F.2d at 614. 
22 See id. at 609–10. 
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primarily affect only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement, 
(2) the agreement concern a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing, and (3) the agreement be the product of bona fide arms-length 
bargaining.23 Finding that the Rozelle Rule did not meet the third ele-
ment, the Eighth Circuit held that the non-statutory labor exemption 
did not apply and that the Rozelle Rule violated federal antitrust laws.24 
 Yet, in 1989, the Eighth Circuit broadened the applicability of the 
non-statutory labor exemption in Powell v. NFL (Powell II ) by including 
within the scope of the exemption negotiations after a CBA had ex-
pired.25 In Powell II, a group of players and the Players Union sued to 
prevent the NFL from continuing to use a free agency restriction, 
which had been part of the expired CBA.26 The court held that the 
non-statutory labor exemption continues to insulate a prior CBA after 
its expiration and beyond the point of impasse in the negotiations for a 
future CBA, if the prior CBA satisfies the three Mackey factors.27 Al-
though the Eighth Circuit did not determine when the exemption 
would end, it hinted that decertification of the Players Union could 
end the ongoing collective bargaining relationship and thus end the 
exemption.28 
 In 1991, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota in 
Powell v. NFL (Powell III ) confirmed the dicta of Powell II, by holding 
that the non-statutory labor exemption ceases to apply after a collective 
bargaining relationship ends.29 Because the players had decertified the 
Players Union in the interim, the court held that the non-statutory la-
                                                                                                                      
23 See id. at 614. 
24 See id. at 623. 
25 See Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1302–04 (holding that the non-statutory labor exemption 
continues after an agreement’s expiration and beyond an impasse in negotiations on the 
subsequent collective bargaining agreement). 
26 See id. at 1295–96. 
27 See id. at 1302–04. 
28 See id. at 1303 (“[T]he nonstatutory labor exemption protects agreements conceived 
in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship from challenges under the antitrust laws.”). 
29 See Powell v. NFL (Powell III ), 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358–59 (D. Minn. 1991); Sean 
W.L. Alford, Comment, Dusting Off the AK-47: An Examination of NFL Players’ Most Powerful 
Weapon in an Antitrust Lawsuit Against the NFL, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 212, 223 (2009) (“[The non-
statutory labor] exemption ceases to apply when the collective bargaining relationship 
between the players and the League terminates.”); see also Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (discuss-
ing the lower court’s decision as “suggesting that [the non-statutory labor] exemption lasts 
until collapse of the collective-bargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of 
the union”). 
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bor exemption no longer applied to the CBA and the continued use of 
the free agency restriction could be subject to antitrust scrutiny.30 
 Finally, in 1996, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 
further expanded the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption to 
cover certain terms that had never been included in a CBA.31 During 
negotiations for a new CBA, the NFL proposed $1000 weekly salaries to 
all practice squad players.32 The Players Union disagreed and after an 
impasse in the negotiations, the NFL unilaterally implemented its 
plan.33 Relying heavily on the exemption’s rationale to protect the col-
lective bargaining process, the Court held that the non-statutory labor 
exemption protected the NFL’s rule which “grew out of, and was di-
rectly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process.”34 
II. Brady Provides Extra Protection from Antitrust Suits 
Against NFL Lockouts 
 Against this backdrop, in 2006, the NFL and the Players Union 
agreed on a new CBA which would operate through the 2012–2013 
football season, but which gave both sides the option to terminate the 
agreement in March 2011 upon written notice.35 In May 2008, the NFL 
exercised this option, believing that the existing agreement gave the 
players too large a share of revenue.36 The NFL indicated that it would 
impose a lockout unless a new agreement was reached before the expi-
ration of the existing CBA.37 
 Rather than acquiesce to the NFL’s demands, the Players opted to 
challenge the NFL’s lockout as an anticompetitive agreement among 
the NFL teams in violation of antitrust laws.38 The Players, attempting 
to end the collective bargaining relationship, decertified their union.39 
Based on their understanding of Powell III, the Players believed that 
their decertification would strip the NFL of its non-statutory labor ex-
                                                                                                                      
30 See Powell III, 764 F. Supp. at 1359 (“Because no ‘ongoing collective bargaining rela-
tionship’ exists, the court determines that [the] nonstatutory labor exemption has ended.”). 
31 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 234–35. 
32 See id. at 234. 
33 See id. at 234–35. 
34 See id. at 242, 250. 
35 See Brady v. NFL (Brady II ), 644 F.3d 661, 666 (8th Cir. 2011). 
36 See White v. NFL, 766 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (D. Minn. 2011). 
37 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 663. 
38 See First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
39 See id. 
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emption shield, thereby requiring the NFL to convince a court that the 
lockout did not violate antitrust laws.40 
 In the hours before the CBA expired on March 11, 2011, the Play-
ers Union notified the NFL that it would no longer represent NFL 
players as a union.41 Later that day, nine individual players and one 
prospective player (the “Players”) filed an antitrust action against the 
NFL seeking to enjoin the NFL’s planned lockout.42 The CBA expired 
at 11:59 p.m. on March 11, and at 12:00 a.m. on March 12 the NFL in-
stituted a lockout, prohibiting NFL players from using NFL facilities, 
from receiving compensation or benefits, and from performing any 
employment duties.43 The district court ruled that the suit was not ex-
empt from the antitrust laws and granted a preliminary injunction of 
the lockout.44 The NFL appealed.45 
 In Brady, the NFL argued that the district court’s injunction of the 
NFL’s lockout was invalid.46 As noted above, the Players had disclaimed 
the Players Union as their bargaining representative before filing the 
initial suit, hoping to defeat the NFL’s non-statutory labor exemption 
defense.47 The Eighth Circuit, however, did not even address whether 
the non-statutory labor exemption applied.48 Instead, it held that the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA), which prohibits injunctions in cases 
“involving or growing out of a labor dispute,” stripped the district court 
of power to issue the injunction.49 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit 
vacated the injunction, thereby allowing the NFL to continue its lock-
out.50 
 Unlike prior suits between the Players Union and the NFL, in 
which plaintiffs sought to enjoin the imposition of certain terms of em-
ployment, in Brady the plaintiffs sought to enjoin a lockout.51 There-
fore, although previously the court had applied the NLGA haphazardly, 
                                                                                                                      
40 See id. 
41 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 667. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 668. 
44 See Brady v. NFL (Brady I), 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1043 (D. Minn. 2011), rev’d, 644 F.3d 
661 (8th Cir. 2011). 
45 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 669. 
46 See id. at 663. 
47 See id. at 667. 
48 See id. at 682. 
49 See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Brady II, 644 F.3d at 682. 
50 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 682. 
51 See History, NFL Players Ass’n, https://www.nflplayers.com/about-us/History (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2011) (stating that last lockout before 2011 occurred in 1970). 
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Brady may indicate that in the future courts will apply the NLGA in any 
case challenging an NFL lockout.52 
 The NLGA comprises five sections that are relevant here.53 First, 
except in certain circumstances, section 1 prohibits courts from issuing 
injunctions in cases “involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”54 Sec-
ond, section 13(c) defines “labor dispute.”55 Third, section 2 declares 
the public policy of the NLGA, namely to protect the right of the “indi-
vidual unorganized worker” to organize with fellow workers.56 Fourth, 
section 4 lists certain specific acts which are protected by the NLGA.57 
Finally, section 7 allows an exception to the NLGA and lists certain re-
quirements which must be met before an injunction may be issued.58 
 The prior use of the NLGA in the NFL context has been very lim-
ited, with very few cases even referencing it.59 Furthermore, there have 
been only two cases in which the court has found the NLGA applica-
ble.60 First, in 1988 in Powell v. NFL (Powell I ), the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Minnesota held that the NLGA prohibited the court 
from issuing an injunction because the “collective bargaining process 
remain[ed] intact,” and therefore the controversy constituted a labor 
dispute.61 Second, in 1989 in NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia simply stated that “[t]he clear con-
gressional policy against judicial interference in labor disputes, as ex-
pressed in the Norris-LaGuardia Act . . . poses a formidable obstacle to 
Plaintiffs’ request” and held that the players did not meet the excep-
tion to the NLGA.62 
 Despite the limited use of the NLGA in the NFL context, the 
Eighth Circuit applied the NLGA in Brady through a literal construc-
tion of the NLGA text.63 In vacating the injunction, the Eighth Circuit 
                                                                                                                      
52 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 675–77 (explaining that Section 4(a) of the NLGA prohibits 
injunctions of employer lockouts); infra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
53 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 104, 107, 113(c). 
54 Id. § 101. 
55 Id. § 113(c). 
56 Id. § 102. 
57 Id. § 104. 
58 Id. § 107. 
59 See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976); NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL (2008 
NFL Players Ass’n), 598 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978 (D. Minn. 2008); NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL (1989 
NFL Players Ass’n), 724 F. Supp. 1027, 1027–28 (D.D.C. 1989); Powell v. NFL (Powell I ), 690 F. 
Supp. 812, 814 (D. Minn. 1988); Jackson v. NFL, 802 F. Supp. 226, 233 (D. Minn. 1992). 
60 See Powell I, 690 F. Supp. at 814–17; 1989 NFL Players Ass’n, 724 F. Supp. at 1027–28. 
61 See Powell I, 690 F. Supp. at 815. 
62 See 1989 NFL Players Ass’n, 724 F. Supp. at 1028. 
63 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 682. 
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made three holdings.64 First, it held that the fact that the Players Union 
disclaimed its union status did not avoid the existence of a “labor dis-
pute” under the NLGA.65 Second, it held that section 4(a) of the NLGA 
deprived the court of its power to enjoin the lockout of players then 
under contract.66 Finally, it held that the district court had failed to 
meet the procedural requirements of section 7 of the NLGA to enjoin 
non-employees such as rookies and free agents, despite the fact that the 
NLGA did not otherwise prohibit an injunction of the lockout of these 
non-employees.67 
 Unlike the court in Powell I, which required an ongoing collective 
bargaining relationship to qualify a controversy as a labor dispute, the 
Eighth Circuit in Brady found that a labor dispute existed even though 
the collective bargaining relationship had ended.68 Further, the Eighth 
Circuit held that the controversy in Brady was a labor dispute because it 
“involve[d] persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, 
or occupation” —professional football.69 Despite the NLGA’s broad 
definition of a labor dispute, other courts interpreting the NLGA in the 
NFL context have found the NLGA applicable only if the parties were in 
a collective bargaining relationship both when the act sought to be en-
joined began and when the suit began.70 Accordingly, under these in-
terpretations, because the NFL imposed the lockout after the collective 
bargaining relationship ended, the controversy should not be consid-
ered a labor dispute.71 
                                                                                                                      
64 See id. at 673, 680–81. 
65 See id. at 673. 
66 See id. at 680–81. 
67 See id. at 681. 
68 Compare Brady II, 644 F.3d at 673 (finding that “[t]he text of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act and the cases interpreting the term ‘labor dispute’ do not require the present exis-
tence of a union to establish a labor dispute”), with Powell I, 690 F. Supp. at 817 (finding 
that a labor dispute requires “the bargaining relationship and the collective bargaining 
process [to remain] intact”). 
69 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2006); see Brady II, 644 F.3d at 671. 
70 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616, 623 (finding it “not clear that the instant controversy 
constitutes . . . a labor dispute” when the disputed restraint was imposed outside the collec-
tive bargaining relationship); Jackson, 802 F. Supp. at 233 (holding that the NLGA did not 
apply when the collective bargaining relationship had ended); 1989 NFL Players Ass’n, 724 
F. Supp. at 1027–28 (holding that the NLGA applied when the parties were in a collective 
bargaining relationship when the restraint was imposed and when the suit was com-
menced); Powell I, 690 F. Supp. at 815 (holding that when “the bargaining relationship and 
the collective bargaining process remain[] intact, a controversy regarding terms or condi-
tions of employment constitutes a labor dispute”). 
71 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (implying that decertification of a union will end a collec-
tive bargaining relationship). 
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 To support its holding that a labor dispute can exist between the 
NFL and non-unionized Players, the court cited two cases in which no 
union existed but the Supreme Court nevertheless found that the par-
ties were part of a labor dispute.72 First, in 1938, the Supreme Court in 
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. held that a labor dispute ex-
isted between a grocery store and a non-unionized, but organized, 
“corporation composed of colored persons”73 who picketed and boy-
cotted the store to pressure it to employ African-Americans.74 Second, 
the Supreme Court in 1962 in NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co. held 
that a walkout of seven “wholly unorganized” employees to protest cold 
working conditions grew out of a labor dispute.75 
 Unlike in Brady, the goal of litigation in both Sanitary Grocery Co. 
and Washington Aluminum Co. conformed with the policy behind the 
NLGA: to protect agreements among employees.76 In both cases, an 
employer sought to enjoin concerted activity among its employees—the 
exact scenario Congress wanted to prevent by enacting the NLGA.77 In 
Brady, however, individual players sued the NFL seeking to enjoin a 
lockout.78 
 After the Eighth Circuit concluded that the controversy arose out 
of a labor dispute, and that the NLGA was therefore applicable, the 
court then determined that the NLGA prohibited the district court’s 
injunction of the NFL’s lockout.79 Relying on the text of section 4, the 
court found that the NLGA prohibited a court from issuing an injunc-
tion against an employer engaging in a lockout of its employees.80 
 Because the text of section 4 protects “any person or persons par-
ticipating or interested” in the labor dispute from court injunction, the 
court held that the protection extends to employers as well as employ-
ees.81 Based on the plain language of section 4 as well as other Eighth 
Circuit cases interpreting that language, the court rejected the Players’ 
                                                                                                                      
72 See id. at 671–72 (citing NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14–15 (1962); 
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 555 (1938)). 
73 303 U.S. at 555. 
74 See id.; Brady II, 644 F.3d at 671–72. 
75 370 U.S. at 14–15; Brady II, 644 F.3d at 671–72. 
76 See Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14–15; Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. at 555; Brady 
II, 644 F.3d at 667–68. 
77 See Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14–15; Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. at 555; Pow-
ell I, 690 F. Supp. at 816. 
78 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 667–68. 
79 See id. at 681. 
80 See id. at 674–81. 
81 See id. at 675–76 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2006)). 
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assertion that section 4 extends to employers only when employers are 
explicitly listed in a subsection.82 
 Yet, as the dissent in Brady noted, the Eighth Circuit’s holding— 
that the NLGA prohibits injunctions of employer lockouts—conflicts 
with at least three other circuits that have addressed the issue.83 For 
example, in 1970, in de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected a literal interpre-
tation of section 4(a) because the legislative history indicated that it 
“was not intended as a protection for employers.”84 Additionally, in 
1962 in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the lan-
guage and history of section 4 demonstrated that Congress’ intent “was 
to protect only employees and unions.”85 Finally, in 1981 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Local 2750, Lumber & Sawmill Workers 
Union v. Cole echoed these opinions, stating that section 4 “was clearly 
intended to apply to the termination of the work relationship by the 
employee rather than the employer.”86 
 Nevertheless, the court found that despite legislative history sug-
gesting that the NLGA was enacted to protect employees, the Act could 
be applied to employers.87 In addition, the court cited legislative his-
tory and Supreme Court cases, which demonstrated a more general 
congressional intent to limit courts’ interference with labor disputes.88 
According to the court, that material suggested that both employees 
and employers could invoke the protection of the NLGA.89 
                                                                                                                     
 Although the court held that under the NLGA the NFL could 
lockout players under contract, it also held that under the NLGA the 
NFL could be enjoined from refusing to deal with players not under 
contract, such as free agents and prospective players.90 Nonetheless, the 
court held that the district court’s injunction of the players not under 
contract did not conform to the requirements set forth in section 7 of 
the NLGA.91 Section 7 requires a court to hear “testimony of witnesses 
in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support of 
 
82 See id. at 675–76. 
83 See id. at 687 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
84 425 F.2d 281, 291 (1st Cir. 1970); see Brady II, 644 F.3d at 687–88 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
85 310 F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1962); see Brady II, 644 F.3d at 688 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
86 663 F.2d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 1981). 
87 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 678. 
88 See id. at 677–80. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 681. 
91 See id. 
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the allegations of a complaint made under oath” before issuing an in-
junction in a case involving a labor dispute.92 Because the district court 
did not go through such procedures, the Eighth Circuit vacated the 
injunction.93 
III. The Brady Decision Undermines the Policy of the NLGA by 
Destroying the Players’ Bargaining Power 
 The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Brady frustrates the stated public 
policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA).94 In enacting the NLGA, 
Congress intended to protect labor organizations from coercion by 
employers.95 Yet, the Brady decision destroys the players’ ability to nego-
tiate effectively with the NFL by stripping the players of one of the most 
important bargaining tools in their arsenal: the “antitrust lever.”96 
 At first glance, it might seem that the Brady decision benefited eve-
ryone; the NFL and the Players negotiated an agreement to end the 
lockout without interference from the courts.97 Furthermore, the 
agreement negotiated immediately after Brady benefited both sides; the 
NFL owners received a larger share of the revenue than under the pre-
vious CBA, and the players received increased minimum salaries.98 In 
the future, however, the Brady decision gives the NFL a trump card, be-
cause the NFL now can lock out players to coerce them to agree to on-
erous terms.99 
 Without recourse to the courts to enjoin a lockout in the future, 
players may be powerless to the NFL’s demands in negotiations.100 
Unlike employers in competitive labor markets, which must pay their 
                                                                                                                      
92 29 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
93 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 681–82. 
94 See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); supra notes 53–93 and accom-
panying text. 
95 See 29 U.S.C. § 102 (declaring the public policy of the NLGA to be for the protection 
of individual unorganized workers to associate with each other “to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of [] employment . . . free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of em-
ployers”). 
96 See Brady v. NFL (Brady II ), 644 F.3d 661, 682; Powell v. NFL (Powell II ), 930 F.2d 
1293, 1307 (1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (stating that by extending the protection of the 
non-statutory labor exemption beyond impasse, “the majority has eliminated the owners’ 
fear of the antitrust lever”). 
97 See Bell, supra note 1. 
98 See Gregg Rosenthal, Winners, Losers from the NFL Lockout, Pro Football Talk ( July 
25, 2011, 3:15 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/25/winners-losers-
from-the-nfl-lockout/. 
99 See infra notes 100–113 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra notes 101–113 for a discussion of the relative bargaining power of the NFL 
and the players after the Brady decision. 
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employees a market wage, a monopsonist like the NFL can set a low 
wage without losing employees to competing employers because no 
competitors exist.101 
 In the wake of Brady, the NFL might exercise its monopsony power 
to underpay players.102 Another lockout to strong-arm the players into 
agreeing to low wages is not forbidden.103 The highly-specialized skills 
of professional football players are not easily transferable to other ca-
reers and players may have limited career alternatives.104 Because of 
these limited alternative options, players have incentives to agree to 
almost any wage rate the NFL sets, as long as that rate is above their 
next-best career options.105 
 Moreover, the offsetting tools available to the NFL in labor nego-
tiations are far more effective than the offsetting tools available to the 
players.106 For example, when the NFL imposes a lockout, the players 
have no other market in which they can “sell” their services.107 In con-
trast, when the players decide to strike, the NFL can replace the players 
                                                                                                                      
101 See John A. Litwinski, Regulation of Labor Market Monopsony, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & 
Lab. L. 49, 62 (2001). “Monopsony is often thought of as the flip side of monopoly. A mo-
nopolist is a seller with no rivals; a monopsonist is a buyer with no rivals. . . . Monopsony 
injures efficient allocation by reducing the quantity of the input product or service below 
the efficient level.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1933 (9th ed. 2009). The NFL, like other 
professional sports leagues, is arguably monopsonist because professional football athletes 
cannot readily transfer their talents to other careers, athletic or otherwise, and thus the 
NFL does not compete with other employers of professional football talent. See Chi. Prof’l 
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996). In defining relevant markets 
for antitrust purposes, courts have noted that the entertainment provided by NFL football 
games is unique and that there are “limited substitutes” for consumers of NFL games. See 
Michael A. McCann, Antitrust, Governance, and Postseason College Football, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 
517, 535 (2011) (arguing that an antitrust review of college football’s Bowl Championship 
Series system would likely utilize a constricted relevant market similar to that used in the 
NFL context due to the unique characteristics of each). Analogously, the talents of profes-
sional football players are unique and the substitute career options for them are even 
more limited. See Chi. Prof’l Sports, 95 F.3d at 599. 
102 See Litwinski, supra note 101, at 62. 
103 See id. Although it is unlikely that the salaries of professional athletes will ever fall to 
a level that most would consider to be “low,” the wages will likely fall to be lower than what 
the players would earn in a competitive labor market. See id. In a competitive labor market, 
employees would be paid a wage equal to their marginal product (i.e., the value of what 
they produce). See id. at 56. Arguably, any rate below an employee’s marginal product is 
“low.” See id. 
104 See id. at 62 (discussing how “firm-specific training” —training that is useless to 
other employers—allows a monopsony to “exploit” workers by paying them less than their 
marginal product). 
105 See id. 
106 See infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text. 
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with non-unionized players.108 In fact, when the players decided to 
strike in 1987 to pressure the NFL to change the free agency rule, the 
NFL hired replacement players without suffering significant financial 
damage.109 
 Accordingly, the Brady decision vitiates the players’ bargaining 
power against the clear public policy of the NLGA.110 The majority in 
Brady states that insulating employer lockouts is not necessarily contrary 
to the NLGA public policy because the “broader purpose” of the NLGA 
is to allow the “natural interplay of the competing economic forces of 
labor and capital.”111 Yet, as interpreted by the majority, the NLGA 
hamstrings the players, forcing them to accept the terms imposed by 
the NFL because they have no economic force with which to negoti-
ate.112 This result is not contemplated by either the stated public policy 
of the NLGA nor the “broader purpose” the Brady majority advances.113 
Conclusion 
 In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in 
Brady v. NFL that a district court did not have the power to issue an in-
junction of the NFL’s lockout. Unlike many cases before, in which the 
courts have used the non-statutory labor exemption to determine the 
appropriate balance between federal labor policy and federal antitrust 
policy, the Brady court applied the NLGA. In so doing, the court for-
feited its power to analyze the antitrust merits of the case and further 
                                                                                                                      
108 See Kevin W. Wells, Labor Relations in the National Football League: A Historical and Le-
gal Perspective, 18 Sports Law J. 93, 98 (2011). 
109 See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 Duke L.J. 
339, 404. 
In 1987, many fans attended the replacement games and, when the walkout 
ended, fans seemed to forget the strike ever took place. Few employers in 
other industries could respond to a work stoppage by hiring inferior employ-
ees and producing an inferior product without the fear of losing market share 
and employees to a competitor. Few other employers or multi-employer bar-
gaining units enjoy the type of monopoly and monopsony power enjoyed by 
the NFL owners. Not surprisingly, few unions face the same disadvantages at 
the bargaining table as the NFLPA. 
Id. 
110 See 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
111 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 678 (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. 
R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957)). 
112 See Brady II, 644 F.3d at 669–681 (interpreting the NLGA to prohibit enjoining 
lockouts of employees whether or not they are unionized); supra notes 100–105 and ac-
companying text. 
113 See 29 U.S.C. § 102; Brady II, 644 F.3d at 678. 
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insulated the NFL, a monopsony in the market for high-level football 
talent, from antitrust scrutiny. As a result, the court deprived NFL play-
ers of important bargaining leverage, thus allowing them to be subject 
to more oppressive demands from the monopsonistic NFL. 
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